

ITWG Round Robin 3 - 24 Hour Report

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Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) Round Robin #3 24-Hour Report

Laboratory: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (United States of America)

Code Name: Ural

Current Status: Categorization is complete. Both samples are weapons-usable, highly enriched

uranium with a 235 U isotopic abundance of 94 ± 2 % (1-standard deviation). Both samples are solid and pin-shaped, apparently metallic, but with a slightly oxidized appearance. Both samples are approximately 3 mm in thickness, 18 mm in length, but trapezoidal in cross-section (the short ends are 5 & 3 mm for Sample A and 6 & 4 mm Sample B). There is no information available yet that

indicates whether the samples were from different sources.

Potential Issues: The current analytical plan calls for division of the solid samples into 4 pieces:

one for radiochemical analysis, one for mass spectrometry analysis, one for metallurgical analysis, and one for archiving. However, the size and strength of these solid pieces could prove challenging to section in a manner consistent with nuclear forensics best-practices, including safety and contamination

prevention.

Delivery Details

Shipment arrived at LLNL Materials Management: 09:30 AM/February 17, 2010

Drum delivered to LLNL Nuclear Forensics Team: 11:30 AM/February 23, 2010

Package Opened/Exercise Started/Chain of Custody Initiated: 9:00 AM/February 26, 2010

Sample Identification

Sample A 3C19VLL6D7 Chain-of-custody initiated as FSC-10-1-2 Sample B 3C19VLLDFJ Chain-of-custody initiated as FSC-10-1-1

Initial Inspection and Photo Documentation


Both samples 10-1-01 and 10-1-02 were solid, pin-shaped samples. They were both nominally 3 mm in thickness, roughly trapezoidal in cross-section, 18 mm in length. Sample B (10-1-1) was approximately 6 mm at one end and 4 mm at the other end of the trapezoid, while Sample A (10-1-2) was approximately 5 mm at one end and 3 mm at the other end of the trapezoid. All surfaces appeared to have a slightly oxidized surface and otherwise appeared to be unfinished. In addition to standard photo documentation, we also took optical photomicrographs for each sample. These will appear in a later report.




Shipping drum as received.




Material packaging.



Left: Sample B (10-1-1); Right: Sample A (10-1-2)



Rough Dimensions of Sample A (FSC 10-1-2) (dimensions in mm; thickness is 3 mm)



Rough Dimensions of Sample B (FSC 10-1-1) (dimensions in mm; thickness is 3 mm)

Sample Mass

Sample A	10-1-2	5.0640 ± 0.0002 grams (k=2)
Sample B	10-1-1	5.6196 ± 0.0002 grams (k=2)

Whole Sample Gamma Spectrometry Results

Note: Whole Sample Gamma Spectrometry performed for initial categorization only. We will obtain higher accuracy and precision from whole solution gamma spectrometry and inductively coupled plasma/mass spectrometry. Uncertainties are expressed as relative standard deviations with k=2.

ITWG exercise, 2/28/10, samples 100226 Results of 1-hour gamma-spec at 29 cm

_	FSC-10-1-1 Sample B		FSC-10-1-2 Sample A	
atom ratios				
232U/235U**	1.58E-10	13%	1.22E-10	17%
233U/235U	< 1.0e-4		<1.3e-4	
234U/235U	3.37E-03	32%	2.39E-03	48%
238U/235U	5.82E-02	52%	5.72E-02	66%
237Np/235U \$	4.17E-06 \$	18%	4.58E-06	21%
231Pa/235U	< 1.2e-7		< 1.3e-7	
239Pu/235U	< 5e-5		< 1.1e-4	

error bars are 2-sigma

Technical Interpretation

Note: Technical interpretations are technical judgments based upon current results and will evolve as more results are obtained.

- The material is HEU of $(94 \pm 2\%)^{235}$ U isotopic abundance. Sample A is approximately 5.1 grams and Sample B is approximately 5.6 grams. Therefore, the transportation of both Sample A and Sample B exceeded the statutes of Texmex. (Exercise Scenario)
- These initial isotopic results are more consistent with a 93 % isotopic assay, e.g., United States HEU, but one cannot rule out a 90 % isotopic assay, e.g., Soviet HEU (ITWG Round Robin 2 from Czech Republic), at the 2-sigma level either.
- The ²³⁴U/²³⁵U ratio is quite low for material enriched through a gaseous diffusion or centrifuge process (typically around 1% or so). With improved analytical results (solution gamma spec and ICP-MS), we can better assess the potential isotopic enrichment method.

^{**}assumes aged material where 228Th is in equilibrium with 232U

^{\$} bkg subtraction in limited area of spectrum was not great, value might increase by 5-10%

- The presence of ²³²U and ²³⁷Np indicates that some of the enrichment feed stock was irradiated in a reactor. The presence of Np is consistent with previous US HEU samples that we have analyzed.
- We have no information yet that indicates whether the samples were from different sources.